widely assum ed that objective standards, however difficult to achieve, are preferable to social or political criteria. The latter are seen as subjective and therefore incom patible with efficient and valueneutral public policy. O ur examination o f the history o f industrial disease and disability policy, however, suggests that there is no neat differentiation between social and medical standards.
In this article we look at the debate over disability policy, focusing on silicosis, the term used to denote a set o f breathing difficulties associated w ith the inhalation o f silica dust in a wide variety of industries such as m in ing, tunnelling, foundries, quarrying, sand b lastin g, and other extractive industries. D uring the 1930s it was considered the " archetypal" industrial health problem. We argue that professional group s, governm ent officials, insurance executives, and labor representatives all contributed to shaping disability policies and even the very definition o f this condition. Because silicosis is a con dition whose sym ptom s appear years, usually decades, after eiqwsure it presented a host o f problem s to those developing disability policy. D u rin g the G reat D epression a deluge o f lawsuits brought by unem ployed workers claim ing disability from silicosis forced major industries, insurance com panies, governm ent, and labor officials to address the relation between occupational disease and disability. The
The Milbank Quarterly, Vol. 67, Suppl. 2, Pt. 1, 1989 © 1989 Milbank Memorial Fund central questions debated were: W hat is an industrial disease? H ow could health problem s related to occupation be distinguished from other, nonindustrial conditions? H ow should responsibility for risk be assigned? Should a worker be remunerated for physical im pairm ent or loss of wages due to occupational disability through the workers' compensation system ? Should industry be held accountable for chronic illnesses whose sym ptom s appear years and som etim es decades after exposure? A t what point in the progress o f a disease should com pen sation be paid? Is diagnosis sufficient for com pensation claim s or is inability to work the criteria? W ho defines inability to work-the employee, the governm ent, the physician, or the com pany? O verall, labor, management, industry, and insurance representatives argued in accessible to laymen terms over who defined what the m edical com munity would later call " laten cy," " tim e o f o n set," and " disease process." The heated debates o f the 1930s became the basis for the revision of state and federal workers' com pensation system s for oc cupational disease. In the post-W orld W ar II era, no one from industry, few unions other than the radical International U nion o f M ine, M ill and Sm elter Workers, and fewer industry or governm ent representatives continued to consider silicosis a m ajor health problem . In part, this was due to the financial and political resolution o f the crisis o f the 1930s w ith the incorporation o f silicosis into many state workers' com pensation systems. B ut other factors were im portant as well. In the 1960s and 1970s national attention shifted to different industrial lung conditions G e ra ld M ark ow itz a n d D a v id Rosner as workers organized to dem and special protection. M ost important, coal m iners agitated for special protective legislation against a ''black lu n g ," and new p o litical, m edical, and labor constituencies brought other lu n g conditions such as " brown and white lun g" to national attention stim u latin g the m edical specialization in the pneu m oconioses.
The Great Depression and the Crisis of Silicosis
The introduction in the early twentieth century o f sandblasting, pneu m atic tools, and other mechanical devices had dramatically increased workers* exposure to silica dust in a wide variety o f industries. Between the First W orld W ar and the Crash o f 1929 silicosis had devastated particular m in ing and quarrying com m unities. But it was not then considered a national problem . By the beginning o f the Great Depres sion, however, a num ber o f factors coincided to create a "silicosis c risis." A s m any industrial workers were thrown out o f work or denied em ploym ent because o f their physical condition, some workers focused on the role o f disease and disability in creating their dependence. U nable to find work, the unemployed sued their former employers and their insurance com panies for dam ages, creating what industry and insurance spokesm en termed a liability " crisis** (Bale 1986 ). Dur ing good tim es they would have been able to find employment despite varying degrees o f discom fort and disability. B u t, during the Depres sion, an enorm ous pool o f dependent and disabled workers sought to gain redress from current and former employers through the courts.
By 1936 governm ent officials and business leaders believed that " silica du st is probably the m ost serious occupational disease hazard in existence today** and that it " typifie{d] the whole occupational disease" problem (U .S . D epartm ent o f Labor 1940). As a result of the silicosis liability crisis, insurance and business representatives ar gued that decisions reached by juries and courts were dictated by sym pathy or antipathy for the claim ant rather than by " objective*' science and law. They, along w ith labor unions and reform politicians, su ggested that occupational disease be incorporated into the workers' com pensation system because it would provide " reasonable" economic protection for workers while lim itin g financial liability for insurance com panies and industry. B y taking decisions regarding culpability out of the hands o f laym en, predictability and expertise could su b stitute for randomness and subjectivity (Bale 1986) .
But there were serious issues that had to be addressed before workers' compensation could be used to address the silicosis crisis. Insurance companies, industry, labor, and governm ent needed to decide on how to integrate industrial chronic disease into a system that had evolved around injuries and accidents on the job. T raditionally, workers' com pensation systems paid a dollar am ount for the type and severity o f any particular injury. Loss o f a lim b, an eye, or a life were all given a price, and workers or their fam ilies could count on receiving a specific amount for a particular injury. These " scheduled" paym ents might differ in the several states, but the principle o f concrete awards for predictable events was the basis o f these system s.
Silicosis presented a challenge to the com pensation system , for the effect of disease was rarely obvious and clear cut. U n like accidents and acute poisonings, silicosis was a chronic condition that m ig h t or might not show sym ptom s at any particular tim e. M edical opinion was divided as to how it progressed, whether disab ility and im pair ment were inevitable, and the length o f tim e between exposure and first symptoms. In ligh t o f enormous m edical uncertainty regarding the nature o f silicosis, legislators, insurance com pany representatives, industry spokesmen, public health officials, and labor were faced by the political problem o f defining m edical and political criteria for its compensation, the financial im plications o f which were largely unknown.
The debate o f the 1930s centered on two differing conceptions o f disability. The first was that com pensation should be treated sim ply as a response to accidental injury. I f a worker lost a lim b or was disfigured in any way, even i f it did not result in any specific loss o f income, the injury was com pensable. A n insult to the worker's body was sufficient cause for paym ent. In the 1920s, for exam ple, com pensation boards com m only held that an em ployee " m ay becom e permanently partially disabled by the loss o f som e m em ber o f his body without suffering a loss in earning capacity" bu t that the worker was still entitled to com pensation for his suffering. D espite the fact that the worker could continue at his job , " the m ajority o f the states have provided in their laws for a schedule o f such injuries" (Frinke 1920) . But the extraordinary num ber o f law suits for silicosis m ade the possibility o f such scheduled uncontested paym ents extremely expensive: " W e apparently think o f every case o f pulm onary fibrosis as requiring com pensation, whether disabled or able to w ork," com plained R oy Jo n e s (1 9 3 4 ) o f the U n ited States Public H ealth Service, and such a policy could bankrupt totterin g industries. By the late 1930s, insurance, business, and pu b lic health officials pressed for a second, m ore restrictive, definition o f com pensable d is ease, one that used decreased earning capacity as an objective " cri terion" to m easure d isab ility (Sander 1936, 2 6 1 ). Insurance, m edical, and industry spokesm en called for a narrow definition o f com pensable disease in which disab ility was defined in term s o f lost incom e, not im paired function (K ossoris and Freed 1937) .
The narrowing o f com pensation board criteria occurred sim u lta neously w ith a m ore restrictive definition o f silicosis itself w ithin the public health com m unity. For exam ple, in 1917 a path-breaking study docum ented the im portance o f silicosis in an Am erican m in ing com m unity by noting that " the first stage [o f silicosis} is characterized with sligh t or m oderate dyspnea on exertion ." The study m aintained that workers at all stages o f silicosis, whether early or late, found that their breathing was inhibited. B y 1935, however, the Public H ealth Service no longer m entioned shortness o f breath as being a characteristic o f the disease in its early stages. N ow , the focus o f concern was on the relation between silicosis and decreased earning capacity: " The term disability . . . m ay be defined as a decreased capacity to do the work required o f the individual in the course o f his usual occupation a n d /o r increased susceptibility to respiratory infection causing a loss o f tim e from work which may reasonably be considered as prim arily the result o f the pulm onary fibrosis" (Sayers 1935, 71) .
The relation o f a physical condition to ability to work served to lim it further workers' ability to gain com pensation, for insurance and public health experts believed that early stage silicosis, uncomplicated by tuberculosis, d id not decrease a person's ability to work. For exam ple, one pu blic health expert argued that " sim ple silicosis . . . causes relatively little severe d isab ility " (W aters 1937, 245) and by 1936 Anthony Lanza (1 9 3 6 , 26) went even further by claim ing that " disability in silicosis is seldom due to the silicosis itse lf." Such m edical opinion reinforced the restrictive views o f com pensation boards. In W isconsin a court held that the com pensation board's refusal to provide money to a diseased worker was appropriate despite his m edical d isab ility. T he court ruled that " m edical d isab ility, does not, in the absence o f an actual w age loss, entitle one to com pensation"
(W e ek ly U n d erw riter 1936, 4 2 5 ).
What Is an Occupational Disease?: The Problem of Tuberculosis Com pensation for silicosis was further restricted by lim itin g liability in those cases where w orkers' disab ility was com plicated by tuber culosis. By the m id -1 9 3 0 s pu b lic health officials and statistician s recognized that silicotic workers tended to get tuberculosis at a m uch higher rate than did the general population. In ligh t o f their higher risk o f tuberculosis, labor, governm ent, and insurance officials agreed that com pensation should be provided for victim s o f silico-tuberculosis (W aters 1939a, 324) . D espite this recognition, however, insurance company representatives and industry spokesm en m aintained that the compensation system should not bear the responsibility for tubercu losis, a disease that was not generally understood to be a disease specific to a particular occupation. They rejected the idea that they should pay for " secondary" illnesses. They m aintained that tuberculosis was an infectious disease associated w ith poverty and livin g conditions rather than w ith the work place. Since tuberculosis was not an oc cupational disease and since silicosis itse lf was rarely severely d isab lin g, it was the worker who should bear the prim ary burden for the severely disabling condition o f silico-tuberculosis. T h e insurance industry, in particular, held that in cases where tuberculosis was a com plicating factor in creating d isab ility " there should be som e provision for re duction [our em ph asis} o f com pensation benefits" (Caverly 1937, 30) .
Who Should Determine Disability?
The m edical profession itse lf was unable to arrive at a definitive diagnosis o f " pu re" silicosis even w ith the x-ray, stress tests, lun g function tests, and other technologies (T riState Conference on Silicosis 1940, 2 0 -21). In the years before the integration o f silicosis into workers' com pensation, juries were left to ju d ge for them selves the adequacy, the honesty, and the reliability o f individual m edical ex p e n s. A spokesm an for the foundry industry com plained that " boards o f laym en, after hearing the partisan opinions o f physicians selected by the d ispu tan ts, regardless o f the w eight o f m edical opinion" make the decisions in high ly technical m edical m atters. I f " difficult diseases such as silicosis [were] brought under the com pensation law ," he m aintained, " the results w ould be chaotic and probably ru in ou s." By difficult diseases, this spokesm an m eant diseases that had am biguous sym ptom s, long latencies, poor p rogn osis, and com plex social im plications-^precisely those diseases that w ould com e to dom inate pop ular and professional attention in the com in g decades. Rather than allow overt p olitical interests to define criteria for com pensation, he called for the " establishm ent o f com petent and im partial m edical tribunals, free from p olitical influences, to decide all m edical questions involved in controverted cases" (Jon es 1934). Som e labor and N ew D eal officials saw this m ove to give m edical professionals control over the definition o f disease as nothing m ore than a political use o f " objective scien ce." D espite the rhetoric o f objectivity, it was charged that the call for change was design ed to disenfranchise labor by strip pin g away their righ t to participate in decisions affecting their lives.
A s early as 1925 industry, insurance, and m edical professionals began to call for the establishm ent o f an official m edical advisory panel. They rationalized that such panels were necessary to determine " objectively" the outcom e o f accident and disease cases brought before the com pensation system . Such a process w ould " reduce the possi bilities o f political influence to a m in im u m and would give assurance that only properly qualified m en w ould be considered" (National Industrial Conference Board 1925, 17) . In the 1930s such suggestions gained greater urgency given " the desirability o f rem oving this type o f case from the sphere o f ex parte m edical testim ony" (Lanza 1936, 2 6 -27) . T he prestigiou s C om m ittee on Pneumonoconioses o f the Am erican Public H ealth A ssociation declared their support for such a schem e in 1933-" W ith out som e form o f m edical control, the m anagem ent o f com pensation for a disease such as silicosis would be d ifficu lt." They m aintained this position despite the lack o f a m edical consensus regarding either the m echanism by which silica du st affected lun g tissue, the course o f silicosis once it was diagn osed, or even the degree o f disab ility associated w ith the various stages o f the disease. The com m ittee acknow ledged that silicosis was " a disease in which the definition o f disab ility is ob scu re." B u t they went on to urge that " medical advice is necessary to determine whether the workers' health is impaired to a degree which constitutes disability" ( Lanza (1939, 316) was asked how he might try to define occupational disease for the purposes o f writing workers' compensation legislation, he admitted that " at one time, I felt that I knew what was an occupational disease, but I no longer feel that way." Ludwig Teleky, an internationally renowned authority on industrial lung diseases, noted in 1941 that the differing perspectives on the relation o f industry to disability and disease were embodied in two competing ideas regarding compen sation. The first method, " blanket" coverage, was all-inclusive, en compassing all diseases associated with employment. Here, even dis eases such as pneumonia, if contracted as a result o f work conditions, could be classified as an occupational disease. The second definition was much narrower. It included only those diseases "peculiar to a certain occupation" and these would have to be clearly and definitively enumerated in a schedule in the workers' compensation laws. In this case, pneumonia, a disease that was not specifically associated with a particular industry, would not be compensated, even if conditions in a particular plant predisposed workers to this illness (Teleky 1941, 3 57-58) .
Insurance a n d Industry Perspectives
Insurance carriers and industry representatives pushed very hard for ways to limit liability claims and decrease their own costs. They proposed that each state should develop " a schedule o f the diseases to be deemed 'occupational diseases' " peculiar to that state in the opinion o f medical authorities and that only these " diseases" should Sayer saw beyond the immediate crisis over silicosis and sought to protect the insurance industry from assuming the responsibility for broader social and health insurance. He maintained that where in dustry was directly responsible for a worker's ill health, the industry should pay. But " no such obligation should be placed on industry" for the general ill health o f the society (W e ek ly U nderw riter 1934, 289-90). Many o f the insurance industry feared that a blanket form o f coverage would tend to obscure the distinctions between the com pensation system and a more general system o f relief during the Depression. F. Robertson Jones, General Manager o f the Association o f Casualty and Surety Executives, summarized the fear and the po litical goals o f the insurance industry which worried that workers' compensation would become a tool o f reformers seeking to shift the costs o f social welfare benefits for unemployment from the public to the private sector: " The chief trouble today is that we have confused compensation with relief. If we can keep these two ideas separate and can restrict the tendency to turn the compensation system into a universal pension system having no particular relation to employment, we shall have accomplished something" (Jones 1934). Anthony Lanza, who only a few years later would wonder whether there were any " objective" criteria for measuring occupational disease, reinforced this position. In 1936 he pointed out that a major reason for opposing blanket coverage and favoring the schedule method was that it could be framed to include " only true occupational disease." This would make it possible " to estimate with fair accuracy what will be the liability that the employers and the compensation carrier have to fiice" (Lanza 1936 , 2 6 -2 7 ).
L ab o r Perspectives
Organized labor, like the insurance industry, the public health com munity, and management, held a variety o f positions regarding dis ability caused by silicosis. Spokesmen for the American Federation of Labor developed a rhetoric o f dissent and strongly objected to the general position o f insurance carriers and industry. 'They argued that " a disease may grow out o f the employment and be caused by it, and yet not be 'characteristic' o f it, or 'peculiar' to it." The schedule method o f payment limited workers' access under the workers' com pensation law and prevented them from gaining restitution fiar le gitimate injuries to their health and well-being. The schedules would " not include any new disease until long after its discovery and after considerable harm has been done to the worker" (Padway 1939, 31) Although it was strongly supported by Secretary Perkins, there is little indication that it was an administration measure. Based on the belief that industrial disease posed long-term challenges that re quired federal interventions and that neither federal nor state public health authorities were willing to undertake serious activities, the bill sought to move authority for occupational disease programs into the Department o f Labor. In a memo to Secretary and Labor Perkins, Zimmer identified two major purposes in drafting the legislation. First, the bill was aimed at providing financial assistance to the states, through the Secretary o f Labor, for control o f silicosis in industry. Also, the bill sought to provide funds to the states' compensation system specifically in order to " give full benefits to claimants for silicosis'' (Zimmer 1939). Senate bill 2256 was introduced April 27, 1939. This was the first attempt at establishing federal regulation o f safety and health conditions other than the more limited application o f the Walsh-Healey Act which gave federal labor officials authority to impose regulations at the work sites o f industries doing business with the federal government (Waters 1939b, 34-36) .
A t the Senate hearing concerning the bill. Dr. Walter N . Polakov, a physician working with the United Mine Workers o f America, then part o f the new and militant Congress o f Industrial Organizations, argued that such federal intervention in work-place regulation was necessary because there was a direct relation between increasing dis ability and poverty among American workers. Workers who earned $1,000 or less were more than twice as likely to be disabled than those who earned $5,000 or more per year. Unlike representatives o f management and industry who used the term " disability" to describe the physical impairments o f individual workers, Polakov saw dis ablement from a very different perspective. He pointed out that if disability was defined by one's ability to find work, then all those workers who had been excluded from employment because o f a sus picious chest X ray or other medical finding were, technically, disabled.
He also sought to broaden the definition o f disability to include " any organic or functional disorder the source o f which may be traced to harmful working conditions or environment." He argued that simply to make up a list o f occupational diseases was inadequate since it would not " include the occupational hazards resulting from the tempo o f the work and from the nervous strain o f maintaining continuous sustained attention, correct perception, and prompt reaction in the environs o f general nervous tension in the work and great responsibility in modern mass production, where a slight mistake in touching the wrong button may kill a number o f people to say nothing about damage, o f course." The control o f these hazards should not be the responsibility o f medical and insurance personnel. The latter group especially were untrustworthy because " industrial hygiene and safety are dangerous to insurance companies' profits since as the risk is lessened, so is the volume o f business" (U. The liability crisis that led to the inclusion o f 'silicosis in the compensation legislation was described by the state's industrial com missioner in early 1936. Elmer Andrews described how " certain in dustries in this State, particularly in the up-State areas, suddenly developed an intense interest in silicosis" as, in the early 1930s, workers in N ew York filed many suits under the common law for damages due to silicosis exposure. Despite the fact that since the inception o f workers' compensation, industry had opposed any inclu sion o f silicosis or occupational disease in the legislation, Andrews ( 1936a) pointed out that " immediately the attitude o f twenty years was reversed." Andrews noted that " employers who had opposed inclusion o f silicosis under the W orkm en's Compensation Law came running to the State pleading for the inclusion o f silicosis under the W orkm en's Compensation Act so that they would be protected against the unlimited and terrifying common law damage suits which were being filed against them ."
In response to these suits, and to the growing financial crisis, in March o f 1934 a bill sponsored primarily by the foundry industry and their insurance representatives was introduced to the New York State legislature to add silicosis to the list o f occupational diseases covered under workers' compensation. Although the bill passed. Gov ernor Herbert Lehman vetoed the bill saying that he favored a blanket bill for all occupational diseases {N e w Y ork Tim es 1934, 1935a) . W ithin six months, at Lehman's initiative, the workers' compensation law was amended to include all occupational diseases, including sil icosis. Fearing that its passage would provoke a rash o f claims under the workers' compensation laws, the insurance industry demanded that companies institute compulsory physical examinations at the work site to insure that all workers in the foundry industry, in particular, were free from silicosis. The insurance industry feared that workers laid off during the Depression might claim disability for diseases that were not disabling or for diseases that were incurred at other work sites. In light o f the ambiguous course o f silicosis, the industry sought to protect itself for previously incurred risks. It went so fitr as to propose that employers be prohibited from participating in workers' compensation after September 1, 1935, the date that the new law took effect, unless all their employees had been screened {N ew York Tim es 1935b). At the same time, the insurance industry in New York announced that they were raising their rates for workers' compensation insurance in anticipation o f increased claims, sometimes by as much as 400 per cent (Andrews 1936a).
W ithin six months all the major parties in New York State-labor, industry, insurance, and state government-agreed that the new law was not working. The employees were no better off, since the demands o f the insurance industry to fire or not hire silicotic workers forced many plants to face " the threat o f shut-downs which would put hundreds o f skilled workers on the street and add many to the relief rolls." The demand for physical examination o f workers was a special hardship. " This resulted in the elimination o f many old and expe rienced workers not solely due to silicosis but for other possible physical defects that could be found" {N e w Y ork S ta te Federation o f L a bor B u lletin 1936, 3 -4 ) . In a less diplomatic moment, Andrews (1936a) characterized the reaction o f the insurance industry more succinctly: " They insisted that the working force be 'dry cleaned.' " In summary, Andrews said, " faced with these rate increases, closed plants, and unemployed workers, matters were in a critical condition" F ederation o f L a b or B u lletin 1936, 3-4) . In the short space o f six months, the blanket coverage for occupational diseases provided for in the new compensation law had effectively alienated insurance carriers, industry, and labor alike. In addition to the trou bled state o f the economy during the Depression, no one wanted to further disrupt the state's economy.
Y ork S ta te
In response to this crisis, a new bill was introduced on behalf o f the foundry and insurance industries that was even more limited in its scope and which virtually made it impossible for workers to qualify for compensation. The bill provided that there should be no com pensation for partial disability and that compensation for total dis ability should not exceed $3,000. Further, if disablement or death should occur during the first calendar month during which the act became effective, compensation should not exceed $500 and would increase only $50 every month thereafter. Compensation for silicosis was further restricted by a provision that where the last exposure occurred prior to September 1, 1935, no money was to be paid (Andrews 1936b). She believed that the bill was a dramatic step backwards in occupational disease legislation. First, she pointed out, the bill placed a " definite limitation on workmen's compensation benefits payable for total disability and death.'' Second, she noted that there was a " drastic limitation on medical benefits," and, third, she objected that the bill excluded " any liability whatsoever for partial disability regardless o f extent or duration."
It was obviously particularly painful for Perkins, who had been involved in the movement for workers' compensation in New York State and had administered the state's labor department under Gov ernor Roosevelt, to witness the " complete reversal" o f the progressive features o f New York's law which was previously " among the most beneficial measures o f its kind in the country." N ot only were the provisions inadequate for claimants, but the bill also provided little or no protection for workers threatened with dismissal. "There was no assurance " as to the retention o f silicotic workers in industry through the abolition o f medical examinations," she complained. In fact, the bill's provision fixing liability on the last employer " seems to invite the continuance o f pre-employment examinations as a protection against accrued liability." She was particularly disturbed by the section o f the bill that prohibited the use o f information on industrial con ditions gathered through the offices o f the industrial commissioner in compensation claims. This, she noted, completely undermined the chances for a claimant to achieve " a fair and equitable disposition of a pending compensation claim ." Her objections to this bill were so strong that she concluded her letter by asking for its complete re jection. " So restricted and meager are the benefits under this proposed amendment that it offers little to workers as a substitute for the common law remedy available previous to enactment o f the all-in clusive occupational disease act effective last September." She con- 
Disability Policy in the Post-war Years
During the fifteen years following W orld War II attention to silicosis declined among all the constituencies that had heatedly debated the issue during the Depression. All the participants in the earlier debate agreed to a more restrictive definition o f the problem. Labor turned its attention toward wages and fringe benefits while insurance com panies and industry, in general, succeeded in limiting their own liability through the development o f scheduled workers' compensation payments. In the post-war years the hostility to organized labor among many in Congress, state government, and industry combined with comparatively low unemployment to produce a decrease in disability claims for disease and a more restrictive definition o f disability itself. The medical and public health community also showed a dramatic change in the attention it paid to silicosis. A review o f articles listed in In d ex M edicus for the quarter century following the political crisis over silicosis in the m id-1930s reveals that the number o f articles published on silicosis dropped dramatically (see Table 1 ). O f the 287 articles on the pneumoconioses listed in the 1935 and 1936 issues o f local m edical society journals were no longer exposed to reports about silicosis in their regions and that the condition had becom e the preserve o f a specialty group . T h is m ovem ent away from the generalist and toward specialization is reflected in the subject m atter o f the articles as well. D urin g the 1930s, the articles were descriptive and therefore accessible to the generalist. B y the 1950s, the articles were more technical, appealin g to specialists in the em ergin g fields o f pulm onary and thoracic m edicine.
G e r a ld M ark ow itz a n d D a v id Rosner
George W . W right along with Leroy U . Gardner, his colleague at Saranac Laboratories, w rote a n um ber o f im portant articles on silicosis that help explain the m edical com m u nity's increasingly specialized interest in silicosis. H istorically, he w rote, physicians sough t to de term ine i f a patien t had suffered decreased capacity in their everyday life. D isease and d isab ility were m easured based on the patien t's earlier abilities an d the doctor's responsibility was to restore the patien t as far as po ssib le to full health. B u t the recent experience w ith silicosis had changed physicians' traditional responsibilities. T he com pensation system now defined d isab ility " in term s o f lack o f ability to earn w ages and not in term s o f a dim inu tion o f capacity to breathe or exercise." Physicians should no longer act " as one usually does in term s o f loss o f a b ility ." Rather it was their responsibility to evaluate a worker's ability to earn a livin g. " T he [physician's] usual approach to problem s o f health [should] be changed deem phasizing the question whether or not the m an has suffered an injury, and directing attention to determ in in g whether or not the claim ant still possesses sufficient physical capacity to earn w ages as stipu lated under the compensation a c t." There were two problem s that the m edical com m unity had to face, W righ t m aintained. F irst, was there an im pairm ent that prevented a person from earning a living.^ Second, was that im pairm ent caused by work? W righ t argued that evaluation o f an im pairm ent was an extrem ely difficult and highly technical issue. In ligh t o f the fact that the patient's own subjective evaluation o f his condition was unreliable and, they assum ed, m otivated by " frank m alin g erin g ," the physician had to rely on his own experience and interpretation o f the data.
Furtherm ore, the data were highly suspect. H e com plained that x rays show ing " an anatom ic alteration o f the lungs or heart is still com m only used as evidence that these organs m ust o f necessity be functioning abnorm ally . . . and the extent o f the anatomic change is frequently considered an index o f the degree o f functional impair m e n t." B u t, W righ t argued, repeated experim ents had shown that there was little correlation between the m edical evidence and mea surem ents o f the patien t's capacity to do work. T hus, only functional im pairm ent could be used in diagn osin g silicosis (W righ t 1949).
W righ t, w riting in the late 1940s, argued that the widespread attention to silicosis as an occupational hazard m isled local physicians. There was " a grave d an g e r," W righ t warned, that these "physicians may be inclined to ascribe all the pulm onary ailm ents o f men who have been exposed to du st or fum es to the inhalation o f those foreign su b stan ces." In the past these local physicians had too much power in m aking critical decisions. T h is was especially unfortunate since these local practitioners knew little or nothing about industrial plants, m ost never having stepped inside one. It was far better, W right (1 9 4 9 ) argued, to depend upon the testim ony o f " the experienced plant ph ysician " rather than local com m unity physicians when m aking a decision concerning industrial disease. W righ t called for more con trol by industrial physicians who were m ore likely to read and follow articles about industrial disease in more technical journals and w ould hence be able to d istin gu ish between diseases o f industrial and non industrial origin . " Several diseases o f a nonindustrial origin are es pecially prone to m im ic the sym ptom atology o f industrial pulm onary disease and also to lead to ph ysiologic alterations that cause an in competency to earn w a g e s." Im p licit in W rig h t's argum en t was that neither workers, their advocates, nor their com m unity practitioners could adequately understand, m uch less diagn ose, silicosis. Industrial disease had to be defined by the m edical specialist.
Conclusion
Because silicosis is a chronic condition, our case raises even broader questions regarding chronic diseases and disab ility in general. A s we have shown, p o litical, econom ic, and scientific argum ents were intertwined throughout the n egotiations over the nature, course, etiol ogy, and rem edy for disab ilities rooted in industrial society. T he long period between exposure to toxic m aterials and disab ility, the un certainty o f clinical and roentological d iagn osis, the inability to m ea sure the degree o f d isab ility , the am b igu ity inherent in assign in g responsibility, all m ade the decisions regarding the degree o f disability or even its existence p art o f a continuing negotiation am ong labor, governm ent, pu b lic health, and m edical com m unities. In this case, it was the circum stances o f depression, unem ploym ent, changing m ethods o f industrial prod uction , and legal debates over com pensation that defined the crisis o f silicosis in the 1930s. B y the 1960s, new constituencies entered into the discussion o f the social construction o f chronic and industrial disease. Coal m iners pressed for the com pensation for those suffering from the sym ptom s o f coal workers' pneum oconiosis as reported by patients and tested by internists; textile workers and their advocates helped define the pu b lic response to byssinosis; the legal profession, som e physicians, and the asbestos workers union forced the problem and asbestos-related lu n g cancer, m esotheliom a, and asbestosis onto the national agenda.
A s this stu dy o f silicosis in dicates, it is im possible to understand the em ergence o f industrial and chronic health issues w ithout stu dying the specific historical circum stances du rin g which these conditions are fram ed. Professionals, p olitical interests, and econom ic constituencies all play im portant roles in interpreting the events in people's lives that are called industrial disease and d isab ility. These changing inter pretations becom e the basis o f claim s about etiology, latency, onset, incidence, prevalence, m orb idity , and m ortality. Policy m akers, lead ers o f interest gro u p s, and m ost im portan t, workers themselves take considerable risk when they assum e that such claim s, because they are in our culture associated w ith science, are, therefore, objective. 
